Strategies for reintegrating forced migrants into post-war Ukraine

Olena Miliienko*

Strategies for reintegrating forced migrants into post-war Ukraine**

Italian title: Strategie per il reinserimento dei migranti forzati nell’Ucraina del dopoguerra

DOI: 10.26350/18277942_000186

Summary: 1. Introduction. 2. Material and Methods. 3. Results. 4.Discussion. 5. Conclusions.

1. Introduction

The full-scale armed aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine, which began on February 24, 2022, caused one of the most unprecedented humanitarian crises since World War II^[1]. Europe had previously faced migration issues due to several armed conflicts, among which the most significant ones were the Afghan migration crisis from 1979-1989, leading to the migration of over 6 million people; the Venezuelan crisis (2013-2019) and the Syrian crisis (2019-2020) each resulted in 3 million migrants to Europe^[2]. However, the Russo-Ukrainian war triggered a migration crisis that has no modern analogues. According to statistical data from the International Organization for Migration, from the beginning of the hot phase in February 2022 until the end of March, 11.4 million people became forced migrants^[3]. By May-June 2024, the overall number of Ukrainian refugees documented in various countries had been more than 5.99 million, demonstrating the conflict’s continued and catastrophic impact on Ukrainian citizens displacement^[4].

The EU Council activated the “temporary protection” policy on March 4, 2022, in response to the massive influx of Ukrainian refugees fleeing Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. This policy provides immediate and collective protection to large numbers of displaced individuals entering the EU who cannot safely return to their home country. Temporary protection status for Ukrainian refugees typically includes residence rights, access to employment, healthcare, education, and social welfare benefits, granted swiftly and without the usual lengthy procedures of asylum applications. This ensures prompt and comprehensive protection for Ukrainian refugees amid ongoing conflict^[5].

Studies and sociological surveys conducted to date allow concluding that migration will not be limited to the period of war but will continue to be high even after its conclusion. This concerns not only family reunification, where members who migrated during the hot phase of hostilities managed to integrate into the new country^[6], but also citizens, especially businesses, located too close to the eastern or northern borders, who may emigrate preventively due to geopolitical instability^[7]. Currently, over 10% of forced migrants have no intention of returning to Ukraine even after the end of military operations, and another 16% have not definitively decided. These figures potentially indicate a high tendency among Ukrainian refugees, numbering from 860,000 to 2.7 million, to remain abroad^[8]. Such actions could lead not only to a severe demographic crisis but also hinder Ukraine’s economic development during its post-war reconstruction.

Despite its novelty, this issue is actively discussed both in scientific circles and practical debates. However, research on the reintegration issue, especially in the context of the activities of public administration entities, is still in its early stages and under discussion. Among Ukrainian scientists, it is actively studied by V. Potapenko et al. (2023)^[9], R.O. Vynnychuk and N.V. Rubakha (2022)^[10], and E. Libanova et al. (2022)^[11]. For instance, V. Potapenko et al. (2023) examined how migration affects Ukraine’s socioeconomic conditions, focusing on internal and external migration processes during the conflict and the probability of labour immigration and migrant return during the post-conflict recovery phase^[12]. R.O. Vynnychuk and N.V. Rubakha specifically cover migration trends resulting from the Russo-Ukrainian war, including the issue of reintegration of Ukrainian citizens and the challenges they face^[13]. Their focus is on building a new, more comfortable life in another country and the reluctance to return, considering all the existing risks. The main idea of their study is the necessity of implementing a comprehensive immigration policy, which should provide a solution to the issue of repatriating Ukrainian citizens. In their assessment of the scope and effects of forced migrations (both internal and external), caused by the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian conflict, E. Libanova et al. (2022) emphasised the demographic losses and offered suggestions for controlling these movement patterns^[14]. They underlined the significance of thorough methodology for accurately estimating migration losses, as well as regular monitoring to guide policy decisions.

Foreign researchers also pay attention to this problem, including M. Duszczyk and P. Kaczmarczyk (2022)^[15] and J. Andrews et al. (2023)^[16], who specifically investigate migration issues of Ukrainians to Poland, considering the high level of labour migration even before the Russian invasion. In their studies, they consider three possible scenarios for the future of Ukrainians: a prolonged war and a continuous influx of migrants, a quick and robust peace due to an agreement and the stabilisation of the migration crisis, and a scenario of a peaceful agreement, but with almost complete destruction of Ukraine, making it uninhabitable and causing a new influx of migrants. However, the main question lies in Poland’s ability to handle a large number of migrants without negatively impacting the Polish economy and society^[17]. J. Andrews et al. investigate the feminisation of forced migration from Ukraine and explore the portrait of the migrant and its characteristics, considering the phenomenon of migration, especially from women and children, considering the socio-political conditions^[18].

The purpose of this study is to explore ways and means of creating favourable conditions, motivations, and factors that may influence migrants’ decisions to return to Ukraine for its post-war reconstruction.

2. Materials and methods

To conduct this study, a range of general and special methods of scientific cognition was used, with the main ones being the dialectical method and methods of synthesis and analysis. In addition, the comparative method, statistical method, formal-legal method, and hermeneutic method were applied.

This study involves an analysis of forced migration caused by the full-scale invasion of the Russian Federation in February 2022 in the context of finding conditions for the return of migrants to Ukrainian territories and their reintegration into Ukraine’s socio-economic life.  Using the dialectical method, as one of the main methods of scientific knowledge, the issues of forced migration, its factors and impact on the restoration of Ukraine in the post-war period, and the need to return Ukrainian citizens to their state were examined. Furthermore, the essence and reasons for possible return and non-return to Ukraine were directly analysed, along with the risks associated with migration processes. The dialectical method allowed for a profound investigation of these areas, revealing their interaction, and examining the profile of a forced migrant, considering their specific features.

The comparative method enabled the study of international practices of other countries regarding the repatriation process of forced migrants to states that have experienced military actions in recent decades. In addition, the comparative analysis revealed the need to create and initiate re-emigration programmes on the part of the recipient state. In particular, the comparative legal analysis of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Afghanistan’s practices allowed identifying gaps to be bypassed in Ukraine’s restoration, especially concerning the issue of reintegration.

The hermeneutic method used in the study enabled a detailed examination of categories such as migrant, forced migration, and migrant profile. This method delved into the conceptual frameworks and essence of these institutions.

The analysis methods facilitated an in-depth examination of migration processes in Ukraine caused by the “military trigger,” including their stages. In addition, the analysis method helped to examine in detail possible options for stimulating factors and favourable conditions for the return of migrants to Ukraine, in particular from the government and other state authorities. Moreover, the analysis method helped scrutinise available data like the Recovery Plan for Ukraine^[19], highlighting its weaknesses. The synthesis method served as the basis for identifying specific actions for reintegration.

The statistical method was employed to explore statistical data on the migration of Ukrainian citizens before and during the full-scale invasion. It also aided in analysing sociological surveys regarding the intentions of returning to Ukraine.

The observation method was foundational for collecting primary empirical data concerning the phenomenon of migration, including researching, identifying, and registering migration and reintegration motives directly from the lives of Ukrainian citizens.

During this study, research from scientists in European countries and Ukraine was utilised. Furthermore, national legislative acts, including orders, programmes, and directives from the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine and the President of Ukraine, were used, and those from relevant committees. Foreign state reconstruction programmes (Afghanistan, Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina) were also utilised.

3. Results

The issue of reintegration or the return of Ukrainian citizens who temporarily found refuge abroad is one of the most significant levers on the path to post-war reconstruction. However, the problem of return includes several factors, the main ones being:

-       security level, which encompasses the cessation of hostilities, including missile attacks or any other military threat;

-       quality of life, including the absence of high unemployment and the opportunity for employment, financial assistance, and social security, and opportunities for economic development;

-       infrastructure issues related to housing destruction, lack of electricity, or other basic services^[20].

According to sociological research, as of the beginning of 2023, about 15% of Ukrainians started to seek employment or professional training for the labour market in European or American countries^[21], indicating a direct connection between the return of forced immigrants and the duration of their stay abroad. For example, in March 2022, almost 21% of people had no intention of returning to Ukraine, and by the end of 2022, this proportion increased to 26%. The percentage of people who could not decisively determine their return (from 10% to 16%) also increased. This shift indicates a change in the opinions of those who initially planned to return to a more indefinite position^[22]. As of early April, according to the estimation by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees^[23], based on information provided by countries offering refuge to Ukrainian migrants and data on border crossings, the number of forced immigrants exceeds 8 million people, among whom approximately 4-5 million are under temporary protection. Moreover, 1 to 2 million individuals are voluntarily or forcibly residing in the territory of the Russian Federation^[24].

More precise statistics are provided by the Ukrainian Institute of the Future, indicating that Ukraine’s current population is 29 million, out of which only 9.5 million are of working age (Figure 1). Even under an optimistic scenario, a 21% decrease in Ukraine’s population is projected. According to the pessimistic scenario, the population reduction by 2052 is expected to be 31%.

Figure 1. Population of Ukraine as of May 4, 2023^[25]

The reintegration of Ukrainians is an extremely complex and comprehensive process involving the interaction and activities of public administration bodies and local authorities. It not only includes creating favourable economic conditions but also guaranteeing security, rebuilding the state, integrating it with EU countries, constructing civil society, equalising social and individual freedoms in Ukraine, ensuring the principle of the rule of law, and establishing a modern veteran policy for the rehabilitation of military participants. According to the Order of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine No. 221-r^[26], it includes a block of support for citizens who find themselves in difficult circumstances. However, analysing this Government Priority Action Plan for 2023, it is evident that there are no real efforts from the authorities to actively pursue a reintegration policy for Ukrainians. According to the Decree of the President of Ukraine No. 266/2022^[27], within the framework of 24 working groups, a plan for post-war recovery and development of Ukraine was developed. One of these groups is the commission for the return of citizens who are temporarily displaced, particularly abroad, and their integration into the socio-economic life of the country. The result of their work is the Draft Recovery Plan for Ukraine^[28]. Based on the project, the following goals need to be achieved for the return of forced migrants:

1. The Ukrainian government should create attractive socio-economic and infrastructural conditions to encourage the return of its citizens.
2. Establish new partnership relations between Ukraine and foreign countries, especially the EU, regarding the return of its citizens.
3. Ensure coordination in forming and implementing integration policies through inter-sectoral cooperation between government bodies and local self-government.

This project provides a fairly adequate response to the challenges faced by the Ukrainian government. Such a comprehensive approach will incentivise and voluntarily bring back forced migrants to Ukraine without coercion.

The most concerning issue remains the return of citizens to the currently occupied territories, most of which are completely destroyed and require 100% reconstruction of both social infrastructure and other facilities. These areas include Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, Donetsk, Luhansk, Kharkiv, Mykolaiv regions, and the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. In addition, Kyiv, Sumy, and Chernihiv regions are still at risk due to their geographical proximity to the Russian Federation. According to the data from the Centre for Economic Strategy (CES), the regions most affected by the loss of human capital are Zaporizhzhia Oblast (a quarter of its residents lost), Kyiv Oblast and Kyiv (one-fifth of their residents lost), Kharkiv Oblast (17%), and Dnipropetrovsk and Mykolaiv Oblasts (16%)^[29]. The return of Ukrainians to Western Ukraine or regions least affected by the Russian invasion is a realistic possibility and can be achieved over time through the creation of state programmes, collaboration with countries that provided temporary shelter, the formulation of comprehensive migration policies, and the development and improvement of socio-economic conditions. However, in the case of reintegration into the front-line or temporarily occupied areas, the rationality of such actions and the feasibility of the process as a whole become questionable, considering the aforementioned challenges^[30]. The effectiveness and reasonableness of implementing state programmes like job assistance, gradual housing reconstruction, and improving living standards alone are questionable from a public administration perspective. It is crucial for the administration to prioritise providing access to basic necessities and their restoration. This includes repairing or building infrastructure such as roads and bridges, ensuring the functioning of electricity networks, water and gas supplies, and rebuilding social infrastructure facilities such as schools, kindergartens, hospitals, and administrative service centres. The primary focus should be on rebuilding housing, considering the scale of destruction in the mentioned areas (Table 1).

Table 1. Destroyed cities of Ukraine^[31]

The restoration of housing and social infrastructure is the main challenge and task that public administration entities must address to facilitate the return of citizens to the de-occupied territories in the future. Currently, the Ministry of Community Development, Territories, and Infrastructure of Ukraine actively works in this fields and has positive experiences in creating mechanisms for state aid for current repairs of damaged housing. Owners of housing affected by Russian aggression receive funds to purchase building materials or order repair services through the “eRestoration” programme. The issue of introducing capital restoration programmes should be simultaneously resolved with the issue of controlling the allocation of funds for applications in order to avoid special “overestimation” or “underestimation” of payment amounts. Although such actions are clearly positive and are aimed at restoring the state, they are unlikely to be sufficient for the actual return of persons temporarily residing in the territories of other states. In addition, the programme is currently relevant for territorial communities that have not suffered crushing destruction. Another concern lies in the safety of such territories, as they are usually adjacent to the front-line zone, thus having a high level of danger and various risks. In this case, it is logical to rely on the experience of already de-occupied territories and transform their ideas to create new and even more effective methods of repatriating citizens to Ukraine. The resilience and adaptability of businesses in these areas are equally critical to economic recovery and stability, emphasising the significance of comprehensive support and strategic planning for both social and economic infrastructure^[32].

Considering the duration of active combat phases and the return of specific territories under its control, it is essential to analyse existing experiences. Thus, it is worth considering the experience of Mykolaiv and the mechanisms of return of forced migrants to the place of their permanent residence. The main factor for residents returning to the city was not only the reconstruction of social infrastructure but also the construction of bomb shelters. The project was implemented in a way that bus stops were equipped with concrete bunkers containing necessary utilities, where people could protect themselves from missile strikes during air raids (Figure 2). It was the security factor that played a major role in the partial return of citizens from abroad, even during the active phase of the war, although most families with children still remain in the territories of another country due to security issues^[33]. Thus, the model of the modern reconstruction of Ukraine should be based on the experience of Israel, where bomb shelters are provided in homes and all social infrastructure facilities. Such an approach and the very reconstruction of objects that create a sense of progress can positively influence the decision of Ukrainians regarding re-emigration. Although it is clear that citizens who were able to learn the language during the war, got a job, or applied to study in foreign educational institutions, despite the presence of problems and a deep mental difference, will try to get a permanent residence permit in these countries, motivating their decision by the fear of unknown and excessive risks of staying in Ukraine.

Figure 2. Bus stop with concrete bunker in Mykolaiv, Ukraine^[34]

Another experience of public administration in the already de-occupied territories was the opening of modular towns, which allowed many citizens to stay on the territory of their community and even return from abroad (Figure 3). The opening of such towns was aimed at quickly and simultaneously settling many people who found themselves without a roof over their heads. However, modular towns show their inefficiency due to the transformation from the concept of “temporary housing” to permanent. An example of such an experience (specifically from the de-occupied territories) is the Kyiv region, Borodianka itself, Irpin, Makarov, Bucha – the territories that were most affected. Container houses that were supposed to be temporary shelters are gradually turning into permanent housing and are undergoing significant destruction. The fact of the ineffectiveness of such actions is proved by the practice of previous years, namely the opening of a modular town in Kharkiv in 2015 for displaced persons from Donbas^[35].

Figure 3. Temporary housing units in Kharkiv’s modular town^[36]

As a rule, the permissible period of living in such container houses is from 6 months to 3 years at most, but such housing becomes permanent for many Ukrainians due to the lack of implemented programmes for providing housing on the part of the state. It is clear that in the face of a full-scale invasion and the need to provide housing for a large number of people and to avoid migration, the authorities resorted to reopening modular homes. Nonetheless, a priority should be placed on capital construction and implementation of housing programmes, at least in de-occupied territories, but with working infrastructure and communications.

The experience of modular towns can be used in the reconstruction of completely destroyed settlements as one of the steps of the housing restoration programme. However, when opening such towns, the terms of capital construction for the restoration of cities and villages should be clearly set. In this case, temporary homes can be a solution to the problem. Regarding the opening of such towns in territories where there were no military operations for the purpose of settling internally displaced persons (IDP) or citizens who returned from abroad, there should be a clear limit of operation fixed at the legislative level and a ban on exceeding the terms of their use with consequences in the form of liability for the committed tort. The damage that will be caused if the deadline is exceeded will be measured not only on the economic level but also on the psychological since such settlements can lead to segregation in Ukrainian society^[37]. That is, at the moment, the fastest solution can be the revitalisation of abandoned buildings, their reconstruction with the creation of social infrastructure facilities in them (active first floors to prevent the formation of a dead zone) and the provision of such facilities for use by both internal migrants and persons returning from abroad.

The issue of mine clearance of the territory is also notable since this is another factor in the non-return of Ukrainians to their homes (Figure 4). However, the solution to this problem can only be achieved after the end of hostilities and with the support of international partners. Regarding the issue of employment and financial support, in the case of the restoration of de-occupied territories, the solution may be to involve in the restoration of settlements on the basis of labour relations on competitive terms. Such a decision will automatically create new jobs, solve the issue of material support without additional burden on the state budget, and increase the interest of citizens to return to Ukraine. However, this mechanism has a similar problem as the issue of housing – a clear control regulation should be established, special commissions should be introduced, or a body should be created to avoid any corruption schemes.

Figure 4. Map of potentially contaminated areas with explosive ordnance^[38]

However, in addition to this, other ways to solve this problem are worth attention. The activities of public administration entities in this area should be based on three areas, among them in particular: communication work; creating appropriate socio-economic and political living conditions; stimulating incentives^[39]. Thus, in order for the voluntary return of forced migrants to Ukraine, the public administration must adhere to the following steps:

1. Interaction, communication and signing of agreements with the countries that shelter Ukrainians in order to restore documents and help with return and adaptation during repatriation.
2. Providing housing for forced migrants both temporarily and permanently.
3. Guarantee of employment when returning to Ukraine in a speciality or previous profession.
4. Payment of financial assistance on return to ensure the most comfortable adaptation in cases of lack of income or as compensation for dismissal from the workplace in the country of refuge.
5. Creating a loyal environment for business development and implementing state support programmes for small and medium-sized businesses.
6. Granting a residence permit and simplifying the process of obtaining citizenship for members of newly created families during their stay in the country-shelter when one of the members is not a citizen of Ukraine but the family returns to the place of permanent residence in Ukraine.
7. Providing psychological support and assistance to persons who have returned to Ukraine.

The implementation of such programmes should be deliberate and controlled, protected from any corruption areas. The solution to this could be the formation of a special body, such as the Committee, as specified in the Recovery Plan for Ukraine^[40], to achieve all goals and control over the implementation of programmes.

For successful implementation, the foreign experience of countries that have already faced the problem of re-emigration in recent years has to be considered. Given their small number, an example is Bosnia and Herzegovina, which in 1997, with the participation of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the World Bank, adopted a “Priority reconstruction programme”^[41]. This programme included two main stages, namely the Economic Recovery Project and the Sustainable Recovery Project. On the issue of re-emigration, the programme included the following actions: rehabilitation of victims of military operations, demobilisation of the population, community service to restore infrastructure and ensure employment of the population. The programme also included microcredit initiatives and assistance in their design to provide to socially vulnerable groups and entrepreneurs, displaced persons, war widows, and farmers^[42].

The complicated political framework created by the Dayton Agreement presented Bosnia and Herzegovina with a number of difficulties during implementation, including delays in decision-making and uneven application of policies across regions. The programme also ran into problems with corruption, a lack of funding, and the challenge of coordinating efforts across multiple foreign organisations and local government agencies. Notwithstanding these challenges, the programme produced noteworthy results. Approximately 1 million displaced people and refugees had gone back to their pre-war homes by 2004. Numerous small enterprises with a high repayment rate were established as a result of successful microcredit efforts. Rebuilding the infrastructure improved homes, roads, and utilities most of all. The programme did, however, have a mixed long-term effect on repatriation rates. Although it initially made a significant number of returns possible, after 2003, repatriation slowed as a result of persistent ethnic tensions, difficult economic conditions, and relocation abroad^[43]. However, the programme established a framework for further reintegration initiatives and emphasised the significance of tackling social reconciliation as well as physical reconstruction in post-conflict environments.

The experience of Afghanistan, which has been operating a programme for the repatriation of citizens from Iran, Pakistan, and other countries since 2011, is also interesting. It is important to note that the programme is implemented with the support of UN. Thus, payments for humanitarian and transportation needs were initiated for Afghan citizens returning, along with the implementation of social projects such as support in the education sector, provision of free medical screenings, and assistance for individuals with special needs.

The programme faced many difficulties in repatriating citizens from Iran and Pakistan to Afghanistan, even with its all-encompassing approach. These included persistent worries about security brought on by instability and conflict, economic hardships from a lack of jobs and inadequate infrastructure, legal concerns about documentation for those born in exile returning home, difficulties adjusting to a new culture after years away, and pressure from host nations to return home too soon. The programme struggled with sustainability, despite receiving praise from international observers for its multifaceted approach. This was because many returnees faced extreme poverty, a lack of essential amenities, and persistent insecurity, which forced them to remigrate or relocate internally. Insufficient finances frequently hampered the programme’s ability to give comprehensive assistance to all returnees, emphasising the complexities of large-scale repatriation initiatives and the importance of addressing the core causes of displacement^[44]. This experience emphasises the significance of continued international support, solid economic development, and improved security conditions in supporting long-term repatriation efforts, and it provides vital lessons for Ukraine in the middle of its ongoing conflict and reconstruction requirements.

Following the 1998–1999-armed conflict in Kosovo, the country had a difficult sociopolitical transition and an increase in radicalization into violent extremism. With the outbreak of the Syrian civil war in 2011, many Kosovar people, including families, fled to the Middle East to join armed militias or relocate to territory under their control. By August 2020, the majority of these foreign fighters and their families had returned to Kosovo, including children born during their absence.

Kosovo took a proactive approach to repatriating a significant group from Syria in April 2019, which included non-combatant minors, women, and some adult male combatants. Despite its difficulties, this programme put Kosovo at the forefront of initiatives to rehabilitate and reintegrate returnees into society in accordance with international moral and legal standards. The main areas of focus have been the legal actions taken against terrorists, the funding of educational, counselling, vocational, and cognitive skill development programmes, and the resolution of issues with post-release reintegration programmes, especially for formerly incarcerated individuals who are not well-supported by society. Because of the large proportion of returnees in relation to the population, Kosovo has limited resources^[45]. As a result, there is a need for expanded civil society involvement, better coordination across institutions, stronger rehabilitation plans, and support for ongoing efforts. Countries confronting the resurgence of foreign fighters can learn a lot from Kosovo’s experiences, particularly about the importance of taking proactive measures, adhering to international conventions, and making promises to social inclusion and justice.

However, analysing all the above-mentioned programmes, it is worth noting that usually, international organisations are the initiators of such actions, which does not incentivise the governments of countries to actively facilitate the return of forced migrants. It is clear that it will be impossible to do without funding and third-party assistance, but it should be created directly by the government of the state, in this case, Ukraine. Only in this case will it be possible to talk about the real interest of the public administration in achieving results.

4. Discussion

The issue of migration has existed in Ukraine long before the onset of the full-scale invasion, driven by imperfect legislation, the lack of effective state policies, and insufficient living standards. However, with the start of the Russian-Ukrainian war in 2014, migration took on much larger proportions^[46]. When discussing migration processes after February 24, 2022, it specifically refers to forced migration, which involves a change of residence or relocation of the population to protect individuals from life-threatening threats due to various political, national, military, environmental, and other reasons. N.P. Pavliv-Samoyil states that forced migration always constitutes a violation of human rights^[47]. This phenomenon is commonly acknowledged to be the outcome of important difficulties such as risks to life, safety, and religious freedom, rather than aspirations such as work, quality of life enhancement, or personal growth.

Besides the positive aspects such as seeking economic incentives, self-realisation, and desire to improve life, which are factors in voluntary migration^[48], according to O.Ia. Kapinus, there is negative motivation for migration, which leads to forced migration, namely, the worsening or partial or complete loss of well-being^[49]. Forced migration has its specific terminology in state policy, including categories like “forced migration,” “humanitarian protection,” “temporary protection,” “right to asylum,” as individuals resorting to this type of migration are socially vulnerable^[50].

Forced migration in Ukraine has several waves, although since 2010, migration in Ukraine began to acquire a more intellectual sense and lose its labour-related priorities. This refers to the growth of educational migration processes in recent years, leading to the development of migration networks with the departure of young people who created families and gave birth to children abroad. However, in 2014, the issue of forced migration actively returned to Ukraine due to the start of the Russian-Ukrainian war. Comparing the indicators of 2014 and 2022, the latter exceed 2014 by 5 times. Considering the demographic and migration losses due to the war, it is evident that the situation regarding Ukraine’s population is catastrophic, as M. Bil states^[51]. It is reasonable to agree with M. Bil because, considering the statistical data, the situation constitutes a genuine migration crisis that could render Ukraine unable to recover in the post-war period due to the lack of human resources. However, the main problem of forced migration is the high potential for non-return, confirmed by the percentage of registration of individuals for temporary protection in EU countries^[52]. M. Bil notes that this indicates the rapid integration of Ukrainians into society and the absence of the need to seek assistance, implying successful and rapid employment, financial security, and lack of additional social protection^[53]. While this perspective seems logical, discussing easy integration and a high level of financial security might be questionable.

The issue of forced migration in Ukraine has not been thoroughly researched and, consequently, cannot be considered effectively regulated. The Recovery Plan for Ukraine includes a range of projects mentioned above; however, most of them risk remaining merely “formal” due to the so-called “wide scope”^[54], and thus may not be implemented. Yet M. Bil notes that such an approach allows identifying the priorities of state policy and effectively engaging both public authorities and civil society institutions in its implementation^[55].

Motivations for the return of Ukrainian citizens to Ukraine are influenced by social, family, and integration factors, besides economic ones. Currently, one of the powerful factors for Ukrainians’ return after the war is family relationships. Thus, 33% of surveyed individuals indicate that the need to reunite their family is the purpose of their return to Ukraine after the security period^[56]. Therefore, the reunification of their families can be one of the reasons for repatriation to Ukraine. According to the sociological research data among Ukrainian citizens seeking protection in EU countries, close family members have remained in Ukraine. Specifically, 69% of respondents mention parents, 40% - husbands (wives), and 12% - children^[57]. However, one should consider the possibility of these family members emigrating to EU or American countries for reunification, not the other way around, provided there is a significant deterioration in the economic situation, a rise in unemployment rates, infrastructure destruction, absence of its reconstruction, deteriorating healthcare and education levels, and several other issues^[58]. Separately, attention should be paid to such a factor as the lack of action on the part of the authorities to create incentives for the repatriation of Ukrainians.

It is worth noting that due to the positive attitude towards Ukrainians abroad, financial assistance, and legalisation of their status, forced migration becomes comfortable for the majority of Ukrainians and leads to their reluctance to return to a country that requires total reconstruction and restoration, thus inherently having various economic, social, demographic, and political challenges. In the EU territory alone, Ukrainian citizens have obtained rights almost equivalent to those of the citizens of the states providing protection. The adoption of the Council Directive 2001/55/EC granted Ukrainian citizens the right to residence, employment, medical care, education, social assistance, banking services, etc.^[59] Furthermore, EU member states offer financial assistance programmes, including housing, funds, and food provision, aiming for the most comfortable and rapid integration of Ukrainian citizens^[60].

Considering this, R.O. Vynnychuk and N.V. Rubakha discuss the complications of the reintegration process and the reluctance to return to Ukraine due to the possibility of achieving a higher standard of living and comfort without the need for state rebuilding and without prolonged time intervals. The essence is that certain categories of people might find it easier to start a new life abroad than to rebuild it in Ukraine, especially while waiting for the end of hostilities and the subsequent reconstruction^[61]. The idea presented by R.O. Vynnychuk and N.V. Rubakha is entirely logical. Moreover, most forced migrants fear the repetition of the military scenario even after the end of the war, considering it safer to stay abroad for their security and future. For instance, qualified professionals may find high-paying jobs abroad, diminishing their desire to return to Ukraine. In the context of post-war family reunification, men are more inclined to migrate abroad to facilitate family reunification, thereby mitigating the uncertainty and geographical separation faced by women and children^[62].

Another example concerns individuals who have lost their homes. It might be simpler for them to rebuild their lives anew abroad rather than returning to Ukraine, where a significant portion of infrastructure has been destroyed. This also includes newly created families, followed by:

-       obtaining foreign citizenship;

-       obtaining permanent residence on the basis of an employment contract or training;

-       reluctance to return due to bureaucratic processes related to the need to reapply for documents and prove Ukrainian citizenship in case of document loss (referring to individuals who migrated without documents, applying for refugee status).

All these factors entail a high risk of citizens not returning to Ukraine and rejecting repatriation. Thus, agreeing with the opinion of R.O. Vynnychuk and N.V. Rubakha^[63], it is essential to pay attention to another contradictory category of individuals who have also become forced migrants: conscripts who crossed the border illegally. It is clear that when they return to Ukraine, they will face criminal and administrative liability (fine or imprisonment for a term of 3 to 5 years), which means that a large percentage of the able-bodied young population will remain outside of Ukraine. Regarding this issue, the government also needs to create a specific repatriation programme for such individuals without undermining the principles of legal responsibility for the committed offence.

To summarise, forced migration is characterised by high risks of refusal and reluctance to reintegrate^[64]. Therefore, it requires a special state policy in the form of incentives, encouragement, and support to facilitate the return of citizens to their country of origin.

5. Conclusions

The research results show that forced migration caused by the Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, unquestionably has exclusively negative consequences for Ukraine’s demographic, economic, and socio-cultural policies. Problems related to migration processes always remain among the most significant challenges for each country individually and for the international community as a whole. However, the forced migration of Ukrainians has caused the most considerable migration crisis since World War II, which will have irreversible consequences for the future of Ukraine. The only way to address this problem is to seek conditions conducive to the return of migrants to the territories of Ukraine and their actual implementation.

Considering the prolonged period of hostilities, Ukraine already has partial experience in the reintegration issue, for example, the return of citizens to already de-occupied territories (Kyiv Oblast, Kherson Oblast), although this remains a major problem. Given the scale of destruction in temporarily occupied territories and in areas of active hostilities, the main challenge remains the return of Ukrainians to such communities. Nevertheless, as experience shows, one of the main factors remains the safety of residence and housing issues, which should indeed be the basis for the activities of public administration.  Therefore, considering the practice of Mykolaiv Oblast, one of the steps should be to ensure that all residents have access to bomb shelters and their construction in social infrastructure facilities along with the reconstruction of damaged objects. When it comes to territories that were almost completely destroyed by occupiers, a model of modular towns with a clear and established period of use could be applied. Placing modular towns in the de-occupied communities will simultaneously provide housing for those in need and involve these citizens in reconstruction and construction programmes for settlements, which also creates job opportunities in these regions. In addition, there should be a focus on the creation of jobs, reforming the social sphere, introducing real transparency and democracy in the political sphere, as these factors are the conducive conditions that can influence migrants’ decisions to return to Ukraine.

Given the existing programmes for the recovery of Ukraine, including reintegration as a way to rebuild, it is important to talk about the actual implementation of these programmes. Adequate financial planning and state oversight are crucial for conducting extensive projects such as housing restoration, infrastructure modernisation, and creating new enterprises. Public administration should focus not only on creating proper socio-economic living conditions but also on communication strategies and collaboration with the countries offering shelter to Ukrainian migrants.

This study could be expanded to explore issues like employment opportunities for forced migrants, establishing a robust job market, enhancing social services, diplomatic interactions with migrants, stimulating small and medium-sized businesses, and creating state aid programmes to facilitate migrants’ return after the war.

6. Acknowledgements

The gratitude of the author of this study extends to the Researchers at Risk Fellowship of the British Academy, the Institute of Advanced Study of the University of Warwick and the Politics and International Studies Department of the University of Warwick for their support in undertaking this research.

Abstract: The relevance is generated by the need to find an effective solution to the methods and means of returning forced migrants to Ukraine caused by the full-scale invasion of the Russian Federation, leading to a global demographic and humanitarian crisis. The study aims to create favourable conditions for the reintegration of Ukrainian citizens displaced by the Russo-Ukrainian war, focusing on actions by public administration entities.The study employs a methodological approach based on synthesis, analysis, and dialectics.As a result, an assessment was obtained on the consequences of forced migration due to hostilities starting in February 2022 across Ukraine, focusing on its impact on the economic, social, and future pathways for post-war reconstruction.Additionally, a risk assessment of forced migration was conducted, analysing its main trends.According to the study, fostering a positive country image, supporting citizens, and preventing forced returns enhance the prospects for post-war reconstruction.

Key Words: public administration entities, post-war reconstruction of Ukraine, reintegration, temporary protection, demographic losses.

* Vasyl Stus Donetsk National University, Vinnytsia, Ukraine, (olenamiliienko@gmail.com).

**The contribution was submitted todouble blind peer review. 

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