The paper investigates the possible shape of the criminal law of Artificial Intelligence. By relying on an approach which does not recognize a direct form of criminal responsibility of the AI systems, the work examines the proposed Artificial Intelligence Act by the European Union – which, to date, has not been finally approved yet – and the risk-based approach adopted. Firstly, the prohibited AI practices are examined, with particular attention to the ‘real-time’ remote identification systems, whose discipline has been changed during the legislative process. Then, the paper focuses on high-risk AI practices, which require different risk management obligations on those who use them, depending on their role. Based on such an analysis, the work stresses that a risk-based approach, which relies on different rules to reduce the risks associated with AI systems, can serve as a starting point to acknowledge the criminal liability of individuals and corporations.
After having framed the phenomenon of in-work poverty, the essay analyzes decent work in the European legislation along three main directions, such as legal bases, defining elements and potential. In line with the predefined framework, the decent work is a concept that does not establish thresholds or ceilings for its contents, but guarantees minimum rights. It is a moving goal and an objective, whose universal foundation is to be found in the value of human dignity and work, which evolves over time and space together with social and economic transformation. Furthermore, this concept indicates an object and a scope of intervention which is broader than the employment relationship, which reflects better than traditional categories the ways in which work and business stand in the global economy and it is useful for suggesting the type of new regulation necessary for those involved in “informal” work or, according to the EU terminology, “undeclared”. The reference is, for example, to the digital forms of work, in which the risk of an incomplete or impaired recognition of the rights to decent work is among the highest.
The Author, following the mention of good faith in the general law on administrative procedure, points out that this principle seems to pertain to the exercise of the administrative function. This conclusion is the premise for reconsidering the subjective legal position held by the citizen in the face of improper conduct by the administration in the exercise of power.
There are certain exceptional cases in which, although adoption is found to be in the best interests of the child, the minor has emotional ties with certain members of his or her family of origin that would be inappropriate to sever. Various legal systems provide for different solutions to deal with such delicate scenarios. This paper examines the solutions currently contemplated by Italian and Spanish law, analysing the regulation, application, effects and suitability of each of the institutes. The study concludes that full open adoption, expressly regulated in Spanish law and of possible application in Italian law, is a more adequate solution to guarantee the child’s right to identity and the right to live in a family than the jurisprudentially created figure of adozione mite.
EU law requires Member States to allow representative actions as an additional means for the protection of consumers’ collective interests by their associations, providing that it should not foster entrepreneurial litigation. Italian law, however, already granted to consumers’ associations entrepreneurial class actions, albeit in a form less effective than the American one, and Italian implementation of EU law does not prevent the entrepreneurial use of representative actions.